INTRODUCTION
In the forty years since the Supreme Court entered the "political thicket"
1 it has done much work. To mention just a few of its efforts, in enforcing the Constitution the Court has required decennial redistricting of all state legislatures and multimember congressional delegations under the rule of one person, one vote;
2 it has laid down many rules for how Congress and state legislatures can regulate campaign spending;
3 it has defined how politics has to take account-and cannot take account-of race; 4 . 4 See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001) (holding that district court's finding that race, rather than politics, was the predominant factor in North Carolina legislature's congressional redistricting plan was clearly erroneous); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 639-52 (1993) (finding that an allegation that North Carolina's redistricting legislation was designed to segregate races for voting purposes was sufficient to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627-28 (1982) (holding a Georgia county's system of at-large elections unconstitutional); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767-70 (1973) (finding that a Texas House of identifiable substantive agenda? And, in the end, did it fulfill or betray its rhetorical appeal? In Part II, I look at this argument in a more contemporary setting: the partisan gerrymandering cases. After laying out the surprisingly complex issues these cases pose, I explore how the "got theory" argument addresses and spins them. I conclude by reflecting that, although the "got theory" argument could play a helpful role in deciding these and perhaps other cases, in practice it has not. Instead of deepening consideration of the political concerns underlying the cases, the argument has been used to foreclose such consideration. It has operated more as a conversation stopper than as the conversation starter its rhetoric suggests.
I. ENTERING THE "POLITICAL THICKET"
A. Initial Hesitation: Colegrove v. Green
Colegrove v. Green
10 foreshadowed the deepest arguments in the reapportionment cases. Three voters sued to have declared unconstitutional an Illinois congressional districting scheme in which some districts contained many more people than others. The largest district, in fact, contained 914,000 people-over eight times the 112,116 in the smallest district.
11 These three voters from larger districts claimed that the scheme violated equal protection because they had proportionately less representation in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court did not even consider the claim. Both Justice Frankfurter, writing for a plurality of three Justices, and Justice Rutledge, writing for himself, voted to dismiss the case for want of equity. 12 The voters' first recourse, Justice Frankfurter thought, should be to the Illinois state legislature. If people were unhappy, they should simply vote in a state legislature that would give them relief: "The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly . . . ."
States in the popular House and left to that House determination whether States have fulfilled their responsibility," 15 he thought it deprived the courts of all power to act. The Constitution, by vesting Congress with such authority, thus simply foreclosed the possibility of judicial remedy.
More fundamentally, Justice Frankfurter believed that the case involved a choice among theories of representation that state legislatures should be able to make. As he put it:
The basis for the suit is . . . a wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity. In effect this is an appeal to the federal courts to reconstruct the electoral process of Illinois in order that it may be adequately represented in the councils of the Nation. Because the Illinois legislature has failed to revise its Congressional Representative districts in order to reflect great changes, during more than a generation, in the distribution of its population, we are asked to do this, as it were, for Illinois. 16 In his view, the case concerned no injury to individuals, 17 but a claim that the state's political leaders were wasting Illinois' representational capital in national politics. 18 It asserted, in other words, an injury that ran to the state, not one that ran directly to some citizens while favoring others. The case thus represented a kind of political "derivative action" where the principals (voters) were suing the managing agents (state politicians) for malfeasance to the polity as a whole. Any individual injury came only through a citizen's stake in the impaired polity.
Framed in this way, the case posed no question about how individuals should be represented in the House, but at most asked whether the state's choice of representational policy, which created some districts with many more people than others, wasted the state's national influence. And as to that question, Justice Frankfurter thought, the state's political leaders were likely in a better position than the federal courts to make a decision. 19 To carry the "derivative action" analogy one step further, the courts were as ill-suited to review these kinds of political decisions as they are to review ordinary busi- 15 Id. at 554 (emphasis added). 16 Id. at 552 (citations omitted). 17 See id. ("The basis for the suit is not a private wrong . . . ."). 18 See id. ("In effect, this is an appeal to the federal courts to reconstruct the electoral process of Illinois in order that it may be adequately represented in the councils of the Nation."). 19 Cf. id. at 553 ("Nothing is clearer than that this controversy concerns matters that bring courts into immediate and active relations with party contests. From the determination of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof.").
ness decisions. Consequently, courts should follow a type of "political judgment" rule, which just like its counterpart, the business judgment rule, would insulate first-order decision makers from judicial secondguessing. 20 Judicial deference, moreover, was particularly appropriate when the courts, as Justice Frankfurter assumed, had no power to draw single-member districts. 21 At most, he thought, a court could declare an existing single-member districting scheme unconstitutional, which would mean that all of Illinois' congressional candidates would have to run in one statewide at-large district. 22 It is at this point that Justice Frankfurter grapples directly with the value of different theories of representation. Even if the courts were to intervene and declare that the state could not follow a particular view of what theory of representation best suited Illinois, the courts' only remedy would be to impose at-large House elections on the state-a practice that, he noted, itself rested on a largely discredited theory of representation. 23 Because of his view of the courts' limited remedial powers, then, Justice Frankfurter believed that striking a plan resting on a bad theory of representation might result in a plan resting on an even worse one. 21 See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 553 ("Of course no court can affirmatively remap the Illinois districts so as to bring them more in conformity with the standards of fairness for a representative system."). 22 Id. 23 See id. ("The upshot of judicial action may defeat the vital political principle which led Congress, more than a hundred years ago, to require districting."). As Chancellor James Kent wrote:
[E]lection of members of Congress by districts . . . [is] recommended by the wisdom and justice of giving, as far as possible, to the local subdivisions of the people of each state, a due influence in the choice of representatives, so as not to leave the aggregate minority of the people in a state, though approaching perhaps to a majority, to be wholly overpowered by the combined action of the numerical majority, without any voice whatever in the national councils. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *230-31 (1873), quoted in Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 553.
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shall have exclusive remedial authority? 24 If the text and original intent of the Constitution do not make Congress's remedial power exclusive, should the Court do so, especially when Congress has long failed in this area and individual congressmen's incumbency interests weigh against congressional action? As Justice Frankfurter himself methodically documented, 25 so many states were severely malapportioned that the principle of unseating a state's congressional delegation on this ground would have led to the unseating of many representatives, which would have made it hard for many in Congress to vote for it. And relying on state legislatures for a remedy was similarly unpromising. As Justice Black noted in dissent, the case rested in part on the allegation that corresponding malapportionment of the Illinois state legislature foreclosed any relief from that source. 26 Furthermore, was equity really insufficiently flexible at the time to permit courts to draw single-member districts? And even if it was, was there any real risk that a state legislature faced with at-large congressional districts would not back down and draw equipopulous single-member districts?
Beyond remedy, the questions remain just as pressing. Why, for example, was the voters' injury derivative, not personal? The plaintiffs were complaining, after all, that the scheme violated a personal right to equal representation. 27 25 See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 557-59 app. I (charting the disparities in apportionment between the largest and smallest district in each state). 26 See id. at 567 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[T]he issues of state and congressional apportionment are thus so interdependent that it is to the interest of state legislators to perpetuate the inequitable apportionment of both state and congressional election districts."). 27 See id. at 567 ("Appellants claim that since they live in the heavily populated districts their vote is much less effective than the vote of the those living in [the smallest districts] . . . ."). 28 Indeed, the Framers intended that the House of Representatives be fixed in such a way as to preclude state government control over the House:
[B]eing fixed by the State constitutions, [the House of Representatives] is not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to tice Frankfurter is simply silent on all of these questions. Still, if one grants his initial assumptions (1) that the injury is derivative, not personal, and (2) that drawing a single statewide at-large district was the only available judicial remedy, his approach has something to recommend it. The legislature is probably in a better position than a court to decide what is best for the state as a polity and, if the at-large district stuck, the court would be imposing a poor theory of representation on the state. 29 Furthermore, the individual voters' claims would not bear on any injury to the state itself. From this perspective their claim to equal proportional representation in Congress would represent a claim for special, not equal, treatment relative to other citizens because it would partially appropriate to some citizens an opportunity that properly belongs to the polity as a whole. It would be as if a shareholder demanded private use of a corporate asset.
Justice Frankfurter implicitly adopts here an early form of the "got theory" argument, recognizing that a malapportionment claim would impose a particular theory of representation on the state-the theory that representation is a right that runs to individuals rather than to the polity as a whole. His use of the argument, of course, is disappointing: he nowhere defends his major, controversial assumptions. But in other ways his use of it makes good sense. He identifies a particular competing theory of representation that recognizing malapportionment claims would displace, finds value in that theory, and thus rejects the invitation to displace it. In fact, he does this twiceonce in refusing to conceptualize malapportionment as involving an individual right and once in rejecting what he sees as the only available judicial remedy as being worse than the harm itself. The "got theory" argument allows him to identify and weigh the theories on both sides and so serves to deepen and broaden the analysis. It does not simply defer to state autonomy. representation, both of which were permissible. 40 As Justice Frankfurter put it:
What is actually asked of the Court in this case is to choose among competing bases of representation-ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philosophy-in order to establish an appropriate frame of government for the State of Tennessee and thereby for all the States of the Union.
. . . What Tennessee illustrates is an old and still widespread method of representation--representation by local geographical division, only in part respective of population--in preference to others, others, forsooth, more appealing. Appellants contest this choice and seek to make this Court the arbiter of the disagreement. They would make the Equal Protection Clause the charter of adjudication, asserting that the equality which it guarantees comports, if not the assurance of equal weight to every voter's vote, at least the basic conception that representation ought to be proportionate to population, a standard by reference to which the reasonableness of apportionment plans may be judged. 41 He then noted that in deciding such an apportionment claim, the Court would have to inquire "into the theoretic base of representation in an acceptably republican state": 42 For a court could not determine the equal-protection issue without in fact first determining the Republican-Form issue, simply because what is reasonable for equal-protection purposes will depend upon what frame of government, basically, is allowed. To divorce "equal protection" from "Republican Form" is to talk about half a question.
The notion that representation proportioned to the geographic spread of population is so universally accepted as a necessary element of equality between man and man that it must be taken to be the standard of a political equality preserved by the Fourteenth Amendment--that it is, in appellants' words "the basic principle of representative government"-is, to put it bluntly, not true. . . . Unless judges, the judges of this 40 Cf. id. at 333 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (" [W] hat lies at the core of this controversy is a difference of opinion as to the function of representative government."). Generally accepted bases of representation include representation proportioned by population and fixed representation by geographical unit. Yet there have been many variations on both of these basic theories, including provisions for minimum and maximum representations per district, and rules changing the aggregation of counties into districts (regardless of population). Variations may arise from the desire to support regional politics, limit the influence of metropolitan areas, or other political concerns. See generally id. at 300-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (presenting various theories of representation and their histories). 41 Id. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 42 Id. at 301.
Court, are to make their private views of political wisdom the measure of the Constitution--views which in all honesty cannot but give the appearance, if not reflect the reality, of involvement with the business of partisan politics so inescapably a part of apportionment controversies--the Fourteenth Amendment, itself a historical product, provides no guide for judicial oversight of the representation problem.
43
To Frankfurter, several different bases of representation were possible. "Apportionment, by its character," he wrote:
[I]s a subject of extraordinary complexity, involving--even after the fundamental theoretical issues concerning what is to be represented in a representative legislature have been fought out or compromised--considerations of geography, demography, electoral convenience, economic and social cohesions or divergencies among particular local groups, communications, the practical effects of political institutions like the lobby and the city machine, ancient traditions and ties of settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of long experience and senior status, mathematical mechanics, censuses compiling relative data, and a host of others. 44 Presumably, to his mind, any of these concerns could legitimately override equipopulousness.
Justice Harlan extended this "got theory" argument in two ways. First, he defended against the obvious embarrassment that the Tennessee legislature had failed to redistrict in over sixty years. 45 In other words, even if Justice Frankfurter's alternative theories of representation were permissible in the abstract, one might well question whether the Tennessee plan actually embodied any of them. Was it not simply a product of inertia or perhaps of no public policy at all? Justice Harlan argued, however, that the legislature's long failure to redistrict might itself reflect a deep judgment about the proper nature of representation. Assuming that the 1901 apportionment was originally valid, which was actually contested in the case, 46 Justice Harlan thought either that the plan might by accident have come to reflect some desirable theory of representation, which the legislature's inaction endorsed, or that, even if the plan did not reflect a theory, the 43 Id. at 301-02 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 44 Id. at 323. 45 See id. at 336 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that it is within legislative discretion to defer reapportionment). 46 See id. at 192 (majority opinion) ("[T]he complaint alleges that the 1901 statute, even as of the time of its passage, 'made no apportionment of Representatives and Senators in accordance with the constitutional formula . . . , but instead arbitrarily and capriciously apportioned representatives in the Senate and House without reference . . . to any logical or reasonable formula whatever.'" (omissions in original)). legislature might legitimately have valued stability over whatever interests the original 1901 plan served. The courts, he wrote, are:
[A]sked to say that the passage of time has rendered the 1901 apportionment obsolete to the point where its continuance becomes vulnerable under the Fourteenth Amendment. But is not this matter one that involves a classic legislative judgment? Surely it lies within the province of a state legislature to conclude that an existing allocation of senators and representatives constitutes a desirable balance of geographical and demographical representation, or that in the interest of stability of government it would be best to defer for some further time the redistribution of seats in the state legislature. 47 Justice Harlan argued, in other words, that a principled theory of representation could not only lead a legislature to draw districts of very different sizes, but could also lead it to refuse to redistrict at all for over 60 years--even in the face of an express state constitutional command to the contrary. His argument magically transformed seeming inertia into a robust and sound exercise of judgment over representational theories.
Second, Justice Harlan defended against the argument that the legislature's inaction had a simple and clear explanation: Tennessee legislators' interest in continued incumbency. With no redistricting, those incumbents would retain the districts that had last elected them and likely maintain their existing support among known constituents. Interestingly, Justice Harlan did not argue that incumbent self-interest was not the actual reason why the legislature had failed to act. He just declared that even if that were the reason, it would be irrelevant. The conclusion that the Court should not intervene, he thought:
[C]an hardly be escaped by suggesting that capricious state action might be found were it to appear that a majority of the Tennessee legislators, in refusing to consider reapportionment, had been actuated by self-interest in perpetuating their own political offices or by other unworthy or improper motives. Since Fletcher v. Peck was decided many years ago, it has repeatedly been pointed out that it is not the business of the federal courts to inquire into the personal motives of legislators. 48 47 Id. at 336 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 48 Id. at 337 (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810)). He would have applied something like reduced scrutiny to the plan and declared that the federal courts simply had no role "once it appears . . . that the state action complained of could have rested on some rational basis." Baker, 369 U.S. at 338 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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C. The Problems with Early "Got Theory" Arguments and Justice Stewart's "Third Way"
On their surface, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan's arguments have much appeal. By refusing to impose one particular and contestable vision of representation on the structure of politics, they would allow states to experiment with different models and determine which models best fit local cultures, traditions, and conditions. Stated this way, the argument appears dynamic and progressive. Since the goodness of different theories of representation changes over time, leaving the choice between theories open avoids freezing-in a particular, and perhaps only temporary, consensus as to the proper structure of government. In this view, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan are not desperately defending the status quo, but struggling to preserve the people's ability to debate one of the most fundamental issues of democratic governance and to refashion politics. They, not the majority, are the champions of change and progress.
There are, however, some obvious difficulties with their use of the "got theory" argument. For one thing, they fail to analyze any of the competing theories they hold out as possibilities. 49 Are all of them acceptable alternatives to equipopulousness? How much constitutional weight, for example, should possibilities such as "the lobby and the city machine" and "respect for proven incumbents" be given? 50 Should somewhat weightier-sounding concerns like "electoral convenience" and "considerations of geography" 51 completely or only partially trump equipopulousness? Failing to consider the legitimacy of a competing theory can lead to much difficulty. Under this approach, for example, many long-discredited political practices would be unobjectionable. Many parts of the country, for example, long employed property qualifications 52 and defended them as a way of ensuring that the electorate was informed, engaged, and independent. 53 Only those who held property, the argument ran, had enough stake in the community to be trusted to do what was truly best for all and to be free from economic dependence on, and thus coercion from, others, 49 See supra note 40 (identifying competing bases of representation). 50 Baker, 369 U.S. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 51 Id. 52 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE app. tbls.A.1-A.3, A.9, A.11, & A.13 (2000) (documenting property qualifications in state suffrage requirements over time). 53 See id. at 5, 9 (describing the arguments for property qualifications in the colonial era and after the American Revolution).
which would prevent the exercise of independent judgment. 54 Nowadays, however, a court would view property qualifications with great suspicion. The problem is not that no theory could support them, but rather that we now think it would be a bad theory. 55 Contemporary conceptions of democracy wholly discredit property qualifications and the like.
In addition to failing to evaluate alternatives, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan's "got theory" argument fails even to inquire whether an alternative actually supports the disputed plan. If only because the legislature had not redistricted in over sixty years, one might suspect that Tennessee's malapportionment reflected something other than merely a theory of representation different from the plaintiffs' theory. Indeed, one might suspect any number of legislative motives that would reflect anything but laudable theories of representation. For instance, one might suspect that the legislature's failure to redistrict reflected a desire to disenfranchise voters, or perhaps that the failure was a result of gross self-interest on the part of incumbent legislators. And while Justice Harlan ingeniously portrays the Tennessee legislature's inaction as a careful balancing aimed at political stability, he proves too much with this argument. Without requiring any evidence that the legislature deliberately chose not to act, Justice Harlan's argument would protect plans reflecting no legitimate reasons at all. The mere possibility that concern for stability could explain the districting scheme would foreclose any claim of inertial malapportionment.
Consider how this type of "got theory" argument would have addressed two other now notorious electoral practices: poll taxes and literacy tests. For much of our history, many argued that both practices promoted republican aims. Poll taxes, it was claimed, ensured that all who voted would care about public affairs. If voting came at a 54 Id. at 5. 
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[Vol. 153: 459 cost, only those who cared would vote and electoral outcomes would reflect sound judgment. 56 Literacy tests, it was argued, serve a similar civic function. In theory, they ensured that all who voted could read and had enough basic understanding of American government to cast an informed and independent ballot. 57 Despite these lofty purposes, however, there was much evidence that many jurisdictions adopted and continued to employ these devices for illegitimate reasons: most notably, to frustrate voting by African Americans 58 and, in some cases, poor whites.
59
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan's approach, however, would have ignored the actual discriminatory reasons for the devices' continued use in favor of a hypothetical rationale that mattered not at all to those who used them. In their view, the mere possibility of a civic rationale, no matter how tarnished by history, would overcome strong evidence of invidious motivation.
60 56 See Harper, 383 U.S. at 674 (Black, J., dissenting) ("State poll tax legislation can 'reasonably,' 'rationally' and without an 'invidious' or evil purpose to injure anyone be found to rest on [the need for revenue collection and the] belief that voters who pay a poll tax will be interested in furthering the State's welfare when they vote."); id. at 677 (noting "the long-standing beliefs that making the payment of a tax a prerequisite to voting is an effective way of collecting revenue and that people who pay their taxes are likely to have a far greater interest in their government"); id. at 684-85 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is certainly a rational argument that payment of some minimal poll tax promotes civic responsibility, weeding out those who do not care enough about public affairs to pay . . . for the exercise of the franchise."); A.F. THOMAS, THE VIRGINIA CON- STITUTION First, [the Equal Protection Clause] demands that, in the light of the State's own characteristics and needs, the plan must be a rational one. Secondly, it demands that the plan must be such as not to permit the systematic frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate of the State. I think it is apparent that any plan of legislative apportionment which could be shown to reflect no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action or inaction, and that any plan which could be shown systematically to prevent ultimate effective majority rule, would be invalid under accepted Equal Protection Clause standards. But, beyond this, I think there is nothing in the Federal Constitution to prevent a State from choosing any electoral legislative structure it thinks best suited to the interests, temper, and customs of its people. 63 Unlike his two colleagues, Justice Stewart would have at least checked to ensure that some minimally rational theory actually supported the state's plan and that the plan did not systematically frustrate majorities. Each part of his test would have done some important work. The first would have looked through the hypothetical justifications Justices Frankfurter and Harlan would have accepted, while the second would have ensured that the state paid some attention to equipopulousness. A plan departing too sharply from this value would necessarily frustrate the will of some numerical majority. 64 Justice Stewart's approach, of course, has its own problems. Most notably, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a court to administer. 65 By requiring courts to analyze whether districting plans are rational in 61 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 62 Id. at 730-35. 63 Id. at 753-54 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 64 Cf. Lucas, 377 U.S. at 754 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is apparent that any plan of legislative apportionment which could be shown to reflect no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action or inaction, and that any plan which could be shown systematically to prevent ultimate effective majority rule, would be invalid under accepted Equal Protection Clause standards." (footnote omitted)). 65 See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW 56-59 (2003) (discussing Justice Stewart's judicially unmanageable standard).
light of the state's own characteristics and needs, the plan invites embarrassing and difficult judicial inquiry. A court would have to sit in judgment of the merits of asserted state policies, make sure that the plan actually reflected them, and then weigh those policies against the competing demands of one person, one vote. None of those tasks is well-suited to judicial inquiry. 66 Whatever the faults of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan's approach--giving the states a free pass--it would have certainly avoided these difficulties and embarrassments. 67 The Court's divisions in these early apportionment cases reveal three possible approaches. First, the Court, as Justices Frankfurter and Harlan's "got theory" argument advocated, could simply assume that the state is acting--or not acting--for a valid reason no matter what evidence to the contrary there may be. Such an approach is clearly administrable because it requires a court to do nothing. 68 Even a redistricting plan reflecting only incumbent legislators' desires to be reelected will satisfy it. Second, the Court, as Justice Stewart's version of the "got theory" argument recommended, could check to make sure that some valid theory supported the plan and require that some attention be paid to one particular theory-equipopulousness. But while such an approach gives states and localities some choice among different theories of representation, judges are not well equipped or situated to apply it. Third, as a majority of the Court eventually held in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court could impose some version of the one person, one vote standard.
69
This standard is easily administered by courts, but vindicates one theory of representationequipopulousness-at the expense of all others. Only individuals count in this theory of representation.
The Court did not ultimately choose one person, one vote merely because it was the only administrable approach. It was not. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan's approach was even easier to apply. Nor did 66 See Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 190 (1968) (noting the difficulties inherent in courts making political decisions, in part because of "the practical impossibility of constructing a completely coherent system of constitutional law at any given time"). 67 Indeed, Justice Frankfurter's approach in Colegrove was attractive, in large part, because it allowed judicial humility and deference. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 21-23. 68 For instance, under Justice Frankfurter's "got theory" approach, the Court simply refused to allow voters' claims in Colegrove.
69 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that state legislative districts must be divided equally by population).
the Court choose it because it represented the only legitimate theory of representation. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan were right about that. 70 Rather, the Court chose it because it felt that some valid theory of representation should underlie apportionment, and one person, one vote was the only administrable approach that would ensure that.
71 "Got theory" approaches, which would allow plans to embody other theories of representation, would either, like Justices Frankfurter and Harlan's approach, also allow plans to embody no legitimate theory at all or, like Justice Stewart's, be unadministrable in practice. No approach other than imposing some particular theory could, practically speaking, ensure that a districting plan did indeed rest on some legitimate theory. Despite its rhetorical progressiveness, the "got theory" argument, as invoked by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, amounts to a cry to protect the status quo. It fails on its promise to encourage states to choose a political theory. By simply hypothesizing legitimate purposes that could underlie redistricting, it forecloses discussion about the very issues it claims are so important.
II. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING: THE NEXT GENERATION
Partisan gerrymandering poses many of the same issues posed by redistricting plans. And the central question remains the same: should the courts enter the "political thicket?" Are judicially manageable standards available to discipline the practice? To what extent does regulating partisan gerrymandering impose a particular and contestable theory of politics on the political process? And are other permissible theories of politics compatible with this practice? Unsurprisingly, the "got theory" argument has made several appearances in gerrymandering cases. To understand its significance and how it operates in this area, first we must understand what the partisan gerrymandering battle is all about. Although it of course concerns one major political party intentionally drawing districts to advantage itself at the expense of the other, the battle concerns much more than that. On the federal level, where I will exclusively discuss gerrymandering, it raises issues about the purpose and function of the House of Representatives, the value of political competition, and how voters should 70 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing competing theories of representation and Justices Frankfurter and Harlan's view that many different theories of representation are permissible). 71 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568-69 (dismissing the other proposed plans as "little more than crazy quilts, completely lacking in rationality" and deviating too egregiously from population based divisions). be represented. In this Part, I will lay out my own-perhaps tendentious-views on these issues. Whether one agrees with my particular positions on these issues, however, is unimportant to the overall argument. Feel free to disagree and argue with them. To understand how the "got theory" argument operates in this area it is important only to understand the issues themselves; it is not necessary to agree with my positions on them.
A. Gerrymandering the House of Representatives
The Framers envisioned the House of Representatives as a unique structure of the national government. Unlike the Senate, the President, or the courts, it was to have "an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people."
72 As John Adams put it, the body of the people's representatives should "be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large. [T]he House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it.
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Nearly every special feature of the House's design was meant to ensure that it, unlike the other primary structures of the federal government, was highly responsive to public sentiment.
To some people, congressional redistricting has defeated much of the Framers' vision. They believe that high rates of incumbent reelection, declining competitiveness of congressional districts, and long periods of one-party control of the House have eroded the accountability and legitimacy of the people's chamber. 81 The 2002 congressional elections suggest this point strongly. Only four challengers defeated House incumbents-the lowest number in modern American history. 82 Only forty-three House incumbents, moreover, won reelection "narrowly"-defined generously as by less than sixty percent of the vote-while 338 House incumbents enjoyed very large victory margins-twenty percent or more, including seventy-eight incumbents who ran unopposed by a major party challenger.
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In the nation's largest state, California, not a single challenger in the general election received as much as forty percent of the vote. 84 And more than a third of all States sent exactly the same House delegation to Congress as was in place before the election. These facts are particularly striking because the 2002 elections were the first elections held after the latest reapportionment.
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Historically, incumbents suffer in such elections. As their old voters disappear and new voters replace old voters, incumbents usually find their seats less secure. These new voters can have quite different interests than previous constituents. From 1972 to 1992, in fact, House turnover averaged forty-five percent higher in immediate postreapportionment Congresses. These Congresses contained an average of eighty-seven freshmen, while the others in this period contained only sixty.
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In 2002, however, only fifty-four freshmen were elected to the House-less than half the number elected in 1992. 88 In 2002, incumbents had a very easy ride overall. Only thirty-five incumbents retired (rather than the average of forty-eight in other recent post-reapportionment Congress), only eight lost in the primaries, and only eight lost in the general election-in each case half the losses were to another incumbent. 89 This lack of competition was, moreover, peculiar to the people's chamber. On the same day that less than ten percent of House races were being decided by margins of ten percent or less, nearly half of all gubernatorial and U.S. Senate races were that close. 90 As one critic of the practice has pointed out, no one can gerrymander a statewide district.
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To critics of partisan gerrymandering, current political conditions have both increased the incentives to gerrymander and exacerbated the democratic pathologies caused by gerrymandering. Over the last fifteen years, American politics on the national level has been subject to a striking paradox: it has become much more competitive at the macro level, when it comes to institutional control, but much less competitive at the micro level, when it comes to individual seats. Recent presidential elections have been very close and the Senate and House have been evenly or nearly evenly divided. As the 2000 elections showed, the two major parties enjoy nearly equal popular support across the nation as a whole. While one presidential candidate won a plurality of votes, the other won a victory in the Electoral Col- 86 See id. at 184 (discussing reapportionment following the 2000 census). 87 Id. at 183. 88 VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 82, at tbl.2-7. 89 Id. 90 Hirsch, supra, note 81, at 183. 91 See id. (discussing the peculiarity that roughly half the Senate elections were competitive, despite the lack of competition in the House elections during the same period).
lege; the Senate became split exactly in two; and the majority party's control of the House stood on an extremely slim margin (221-212).
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In terms of popular support, the two major parties are more evenly matched than at any time since the nineteenth century. 93 And although the midterm elections of 2002 increased the size of the ruling party's margin in the House by six seats, 94 that margin still stands near its modern low. The 2002 elections culminated a decade-long trend. The largest margin of majority in the House since 1992 was less than one-third the historical average from 1960 until 1992, and the average margin for the last ten years is barely one-sixth of the average for the preceding period. 95 By any standard-historical or absolutethe margin of control in the House has been astonishingly narrow over the past ten years.
At first that might appear to be a good thing. After all, one might think that small margins of control would force the parties to cooperate, solve problems together, and allow some of their more centrist representatives a greater voice. However, the opposite may be true. First, the major parties in the House have become increasingly homogeneous and ideologically polarized. Second, the major parties in the House have become much more internally homogeneous. There is now much less divergence than before within each party. As a comparison of Figures 1 through 4 shows, not only have both parties in the House shifted more towards the extremes, leading to less overlap in their policy positions, but each party has a much more cohesive focus than before. 
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In other words, the two major parties in the House have become increasingly discrete and insular. On policy issues, they are both more distant from each other and more internally homogeneous than before.
In such a world, small differences matter. The increasingly narrow margins of control over the past ten years mean that a gain of just a few seats can completely switch party control of the House. From the 1970s through the early 1990s, for example, changes of up to twenty-five seats in any election would have made no difference to which party controlled the House. 105 After 1992, however, a difference of as few as six seats and at most thirteen would have made all the difference. 106 The increasing homogeneity of each party over that same time, moreover, means that the party in control now should have a 104 Figure 4 is taken from id. at 247 fig.8-4D . 105 greater focus and should have to worry less about its individual members deviating from its preferred policy positions. The increasing polarization sharply raises the stakes of House control for each side. Since larger policy differences separate the parties, such control presumably has a greater effect on legislative policy outcomes.
In the 1970s, when less distance separated the two parties and they were less homogeneous, control of the House mattered less because the policy outcomes sought and produced under one party would have been relatively similar to those sought and produced under the other. Once the parties' policy preferences markedly diverged and party members in the House voted more in lockstep than before, the policy stakes greatly increased. Because of their ideological polarization, each party wants more extreme policies than before and, because of homogenization, the party in control finds it much easier to achieve its preferred policies, even with a small margin. 107 Thus, the stakes of redistricting have grown in two mutually reinforcing ways: narrow margins of control mean that differences in just a few seats can change which party controls the House, and a difference in party control makes a much larger difference in legislative policy outcomes. Shifting fewer seats produces larger legislative payoffs than before.
To gain seats through redistricting requires a party in control of the redistricting process in individual states to follow a simple strategy: that party must make its opponent's districts as few as possible and its own as many as possible. To minimize the number of opposition districts, the party in control must pack as many of its opponent's voters as possible into each district the opponent controls. This leads to the opposition party winning districts by a landslide, but winning fewer districts. By contrast, to maximize the number of its own districts, the controlling party must assign as few of its own voters to as many districts as it can while maintaining a reliable majority in each of them. This leads to the controlling party giving itself a comfortable but less sizeable margin in the maximum number of districts. The strategy thus aims to make virtually every district noncompetitive and achieves its partisan ends by making the districts differentially noncompetitive for each party. By creating super-safe districts for the opposing party and merely safe districts for itself, the controlling party "wastes" minority party votes and efficiently distributes its own. Knowing that "one person, one vote" and race are virtually their only legal con-straints, 108 party strategists feel free to draw such lines. In a real sense, representatives can reflect the districts of the people, rather than the people of the districts.
A party, of course, wants to reach no further than it can reliably grasp. Otherwise, a small shift in public opinion can cause its gerrymandering to backfire, giving the district to the other party.
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To prevent this, the party in control of redistricting can be expected to give itself more than a thin margin of victory in its districts. It may even sacrifice a seat or two to ensure that it will maintain control over a majority of districts should voter sentiment shift somewhat in the later years of the reapportionment cycle. This insurance reduces competition in nearly every district. The party that is victim to the gerrymander will enjoy wins in as few districts as possible but will win each by a landslide; the party in control of the gerrymander will enjoy wins in a disproportionately large number of districts but by smaller margins. Few, if any, districts will remain in true competition.
Empirical research shows how great this effect is. As one leading political scientist describes it, redistricting after the last census gave:
[M]arginal incumbents of both parties got safer districts. Redistricting gave eight Democrat incumbents who had been representing Bushmajority districts [districts in which Republican George W. Bush had won the popular vote in the 2000 presidential election] new Goremajority districts [districts in which Democrat Al Gore had won the popular vote in that election]; only one suffered the contrary switch . . . . All thirteen of the switches involving Republican incumbents were from Gore-to Bush-majority districts. Of the twenty-five districts Republicans had won in 2000 with less than 55 percent of the major-party vote, eighteen were strengthened by increasing the proportion of Bush voters; of the nineteen similarly marginal Democratic districts, fifteen were given a larger share of Gore voters. Thus three quarters of the marginal districts were made safer by redistricting, half of them by more than 2 percentage points (in presidential vote share). If analysis is confined to districts with 108 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that state legislative districts must be divided equally by population); see also believes that future electoral or demographic tides will flow in its direction, then the party will be more willing to take chances by creating more competitive seats.").
marginal incumbents who sought reelection in 2002, thirty-two of their forty districts (80 percent) were made safer by redistricting.
110
In individual states, the effects could be even more extreme. Gerrymandering in California after the last census, for example, "left not a single one of the state's fifty-three House districts truly competitive." 111 Long-term trends exacerbate this effect. Since at least the midtwentieth century, competitiveness in House districts has markedly declined. In the decade of elections after the 1960s reapportionment, for example, an average of 74 seats were won with less than 55% of the majority party vote. 112 In the decade of elections after the 1990s reapportionment, by contrast, that figure fell by more than 10% to 65 seats. 113 More ominously, in the years prior to the 2002 election (with the exception of the 1972 Nixon-McGovern election), elections immediately following reapportionment have always shown an increase in district competitiveness. As one commentator has summed up the data shown in Table 1 : This lack of competition was peculiar to U.S. House elections: On the same day when barely one out of twelve House elections were being decided by ten percentage points or less, roughly half of all gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections were that close. Deadened competition has both individual and aggregate effects. On the individual level, it means that representatives have less fear of the regular judgment of the voters. The less competitive districts are, the less incumbents will fear defeat at the polls, thus making them less responsive to general election voters. A representative who squeaks by will be very sensitive to what constituents want; a representative assured of a landslide will be less so. Uncompetitive districts, then, weaken the structures of accountability that the Framers believed made members of the House truly responsive to-and thus truly representative of-the people.
114
On the aggregate level, deadened competition means that the House of Representatives as a whole will not reflect changes in sentiment among voters as well. Because so few districts can realistically change parties, the House as a whole will fail to track shifts in underly-ing popular opinion. A national swing of five percent in voter opinion-a sea change in most elections-will change very few seats in the current House of Representatives. Gerrymandering thus creates a kind of inertia that arrests the House's dynamic process. It makes it less certain that votes in the chamber will reflect shifts in popular opinion, and thus frustrates change and creates undemocratic slippage between the people and their government.
Although partisan gerrymandering deadens competition within individual districts, that is its method, not its aim. Its aim, of course, is to give one of the major parties an advantage over the other in Congress. 116 Comparing the major parties' shares of the 2000 presidential vote in the pre-and post-reapportionment House districts demonstrates how thoroughly current political gerrymandering has achieved this. As Gary Jacobson has explained, "[t]he Bush-Gore vote division provides an excellent approximation of district partisanship. Shortterm forces were evenly balanced in 2000, and party line voting was the highest in decades; hence, both the national and district-level vote reflected the underlying partisan balance with unusual accuracy."
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In other words, districts won by Democratic candidate Al Gore are generally Democratic while districts won by Republican candidate George W. Bush are generally Republican. As Figure 5 shows, the post-census redistrictings helped make many districts comfortably but leanly Republican and many other districts landslide Democratic. The last cycle of redistricting, in other words, made the parties' seats differentially safe in a way that gave one side an artificial edge in the House. In fact, all the districts in the country with party landslides of over eighty percent were won by Democrats. In some states, of course, Democratic-controlled redistrictings artificially plumped the Democrats' share of the state congressional delegation; in others, Republican-controlled redistrictings artificially plumped the Republicans' share. Both sides are guilty of taking advantage of such possibilities because the stakes are so high. In the 1980s, California Democrats were among the most notorious offenders; 119 in 2003, the Texas Republicans were the notable offenders. 120 On balance, however, as Figure 5 shows, the post-2000 census plans advantaged the Republicans. 118 Figure 5 is taken from Hirsch, supra note 81, at 197 fig.2 . Figure 5 shows the number of districts won by Bush and by Gore, broken down by the percentage of the vote that the winner received in that district. For instance, Bush won by receiving 50-55% of the votes in 68 districts, while Gore won with 50-55% of the votes in only 43 districts; Bush did not win a single district by more than 90% of the vote, whereas Gore won four districts with more than 90% of the vote. The net effect was to increase the number of Republican districts by nine, from 228 to 237 121 -perhaps giving Republicans control of the House for the remainder of the decade.
By making individual districts noncompetitive, partisan gerrymandering also frustrates the representation of centrist views in the House. Safe districts are drawn to be either more conservative or more liberal than a non-gerrymandered district would be; their average voter is intended to be reliably off the overall median. Artificially skewing districts in this way ensures the election of candidates from particular parties, but also makes it less likely that candidates who reflect the views of these median voters will be elected. In advantaging one political party, then, partisan gerrymandering not only disadvantages the other major political party and makes districts uncompetitive, but it also makes the representation of centrist views more difficult.
Another feature of elections exacerbates this effect. Deadening competition between the major parties shifts any real political competition in the district into one party's primary, where ideological activists dominate.
122 Centrist candidates of both parties have trouble surviving in safe districts because in the primaries they must appeal to a group of voters representative neither of the district as a whole, nor of the party as a whole-rather, the group of voters at primaries represents only the party's more partisan members. 123 More sharply ideological candidates appeal to this primary electorate. Democratic primary voters vote for more left-leaning candidates than the average Democrat, let alone the average voter, would, and Republican primary voters vote for more right-leaning candidates than the average Republican or average voter would. As a result, districts elect candidates more extreme than the general population of voters in the district, and the House has become bipolar 124 even though the country has 121 Jacobson, supra note 110, at 9 (citing Jacobson, supra note 92, at 5-13). (stating that because primary electorates are small and unrepresentative, "members of Congress may be forced to play to noncentrist elements of their constituencies"). 123 Id. 124 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing DW-NOMINATE scores and their suggestion that the ideological gap between political parties has grown in the last several decades).
stayed largely in the middle. 125 Making districts safe thus silences the center.
Unlike the Framers' vision, a gerrymandered House does not reflect popular sentiment in all its diversity, but the sentiment of one extreme or the other in districts across the country. And that is not the worst. Just as polarization within the House is one of the primary effects of partisan gerrymandering, it is also one of the primary causes. Polarization of a nearly evenly split House greatly raises the stakes of redistricting and so increases the incentives to gerrymander, which in turn leads to further polarization in the House. Far from limiting itself, under these conditions, partisan gerrymandering is selfintensifying. Polarization and partisan gerrymandering thus form a vicious circle where increases in one increase the likelihood of the other.
The issues surrounding partisan gerrymandering are thus quite complex. It raises not only the obvious concern of partisan political bias, but also less obvious concerns like the artificial lock-in of a temporary majority in what was intended to be the most responsive part of the federal government; reduced competition within districts; reduced accountability and responsiveness of House members; and increased polarization in the legislature. Existing doctrine does not consider, let alone address, most of these concerns.
B. Saving Politics from Theory: Political Gerrymandering in the Court
In Davis v. Bandemer, 126 the Supreme Court first took up the gerrymandering issue and splintered over whether and how to address it. Although a majority of six Justices believed that partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable, 127 no majority agreed as to how to handle them.
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The decisive plurality of four generally followed the ap- News. ("Self-described moderates (40%) continue to outnumber those who consider themselves conservatives (33%) or liberals (18%). These numbers have been remarkably stable over more than 30 years.").
126 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (White, J., plurality opinion). 127 Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, id. at 123-25, Powell, and Stevens, id. at 161 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Stevens, J.,) believed the partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable.
128 Justice White wrote the plurality opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined. Id. at 123 (White, J., plurality opinion). Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment, id. at 143 (Burger, C.J., concurring), as did as did Justice proach taken in the racial gerrymandering cases, but changed the governing equal protection standards to account for perceived differences between race and politics. 129 The doctrinal shift was dramatic. Ordinary equal protection doctrine requires a showing of both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effects.
130
Of these two requirements, intent is usually the more difficult to prove. 131 In Bandemer, however, the plurality turned that on its head. "As long as redistricting is done by a legislature," the plurality wrote, "it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended." Discriminatory effects, by contrast, would be very difficult to prove. As the plurality described the standard, "unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole."
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Two parts of this standard posed special difficulties to plaintiffs. First, showing that a system consistently degrades a voter's or group of voters' influence requires several election cycles of experience, or very firm predictive data, which is difficult to obtain. Plaintiffs, then, would likely not be able to assert any claim until far into the ten-year districting cycle. Second, plaintiffs had to show not just that the O'Connor, whose concurring opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, id. at 144 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Powell concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justice Stevens. Id. at 161 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 129 See id. at 141-43 ("We . . . conclude . . . that a threshold showing of discriminatory vote dilution is required for a prima facie case of an equal protection violation."). 130 See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1980) ("Although dicta may be drawn from a few of the Court's earlier opinions suggesting that disproportionate effects alone may establish a claim of unconstitutional racial vote dilution, the fact is that such a view is not supported by any decision of this Court."); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact."). 131 See e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) ("As overtly bigoted behavior has become more unfashionable, evidence of intent has become harder to find."); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1137 (1989) ("Not only is it much more difficult to prove intent in the housing and employment cases, but, more interestingly, they involve a completely different kind of inquiry.").
132 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129 (White, J., plurality opinion). In an accompanying footnote, the plurality softened this view somewhat. It noted that because "discriminatory intent may not be difficult to prove in this context does not, of course, mean that it need not be proved at all to succeed on such a claim." Id. at 129 n.11. 133 Id. at 132.
scheme degraded their voting power but also that it degraded their influence on the "political process as a whole."
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In Badham v. Eu, 135 for example, a district court found that this second requirement saved an egregious Democratic gerrymander of California's congressional districts after the 1980 census. Since there were no allegations that California Republicans were "shut out of the political process" or that anyone had ever "interfered with Republican registration, organizing, voting, fund-raising, or campaigning" or Republicans' ability "to speak out on issues of public concern," 136 the district court granted the state's motion to dismiss. 137 The court, in fact, dismissed the case with prejudice because other facts of which it took judicial notice showed that Republicans had some influence in other parts of the political process. Chief among these facts was that California had a Republican governor, one Republican senator, and a former Republican governor who, for seven years, had been President of the United States.
138 But of course none of those officials had been elected from individual districts.
The plurality believed that such a high standard was appropriate because "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections."
139 As the plurality in Bandemer stated:
An individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district. We cannot presume in such a situation, without actual proof to the contrary, that the candidate elected will entirely ignore the interests of those voters. This is true even in a safe district where the losing group loses election after election. Thus, a group's electoral power is not unconstitutionally diminished by the simple fact of an apportionment scheme that makes winning elections more difficult, and a failure of proportional representation alone does not constitute impermissible discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. 137 See id. at 672 (noting that because California Republicans represent a potent political force, it is unnecessary for the judiciary to intervene as it would in order to "protect the trampled rights of a disadvantaged political or racial minority"). 138 Id.
139 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132 (White, J., plurality opinion). 140 Id.
While it is true that voters can achieve some representation even through representatives they voted against, it is also true that "winning elections" is the most powerful way to influence the political process and that artificially making winning elections more difficult for one group than for others impairs that group's political power. Not only did the plurality's reasoning surprisingly underplay the importance of elections, it also failed to consider the wider range of concerns raised by partisan gerrymandering. Although it acknowledged the partisan skew that gerrymandering may give to politics, 141 it did not consider issues of lock-in, competitiveness, responsiveness, accountability, and polarization-all of which deeply affect the substance and structure of politics. The equal protection lens developed by the plurality placed all these concerns far out of focus.
To her credit, Justice O'Connor did look more broadly. 142 Even she, however, saw only one larger political concern implicated in the dispute: whether constitutional regulation of partisan gerrymandering would undermine the two-party system, which she viewed as the bedrock of our political system. As Justice O'Connor put it:
There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective government. The preservation and health of our political institutions, state and federal, depends to no small extent on the continued vitality of our two-party system, which permits both stability and measured change. 143 Her fear was that once the Court entered this area it would have no choice but to apply a proportionality test to all identifiable "political, religious, ethnic, racial, occupational, and socioeconomic groups."
144 And even if the Court limited the inquiry to just political groups, she believed " [t] here is simply no clear stopping point to prevent the gradual evolution of a requirement of roughly proportional representation for every cohesive political group." 145 If realized, her fear would have moved the country towards a coalitional multiparty 141 See id. at 116-17 (acknowledging that a Republican advantage was "achieved by 'stacking' Democrats into districts with large Democratic majorities and 'splitting' them in other districts so as to give Republicans safe but not excessive majorities in those districts"). 142 See id. at 144-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (expressing concern that if political gerrymandering becomes justiciable, such judicial intervention will pose a risk to our political institution). 143 Id. 144 Id. at 147. 145 Id.
government. That, by itself, was enough for her to deny the courts power to hear these claims.
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Her approach represents another version of the "got theory" argument. Unlike what Justices Frankfurter and Harlan might argue, 147 Justice O'Connor does not argue that a viable competing theory of representation underlies partisan gerrymandering. Two-party government, she recognized, is not the aim of partisan gerrymandering. Rather, artificially "skewed" two-party government is its effect. But that is still a form of two-party politics. By contrast, imposing a theory of partisan fairness on the redistricting process would, she believes, have the effect of undermining what she sees as a foundational value of our political system. 148 Whether she is right or not, her argument does extend the frame of analysis to encompass a relevant political value invisible to ordinary equal protection doctrine, and implicitly weighs that value against others that judicial intervention would promote. She invokes a type of "got theory" argument to decide what would make the best pragmatic sense, not to reflexively foreclose judicial inquiry.
In Vieth v. Jubelirer, 149 the Supreme Court's recent political gerrymandering decision, the Court surprisingly avoided "got theory" arguments altogether. This case challenged a 2002 Pennsylvania congressional districting scheme that aided Republican congressional candidates, and which was passed by a Republican-controlled state legislature and signed by a Republican governor. 150 The Court reached no majority opinion. Instead, Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality of four Justices, 151 found all political gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable for lack of any judicially manageable standards to us in deciding them. 152 Justice Kennedy, by contrast, found political gerrymandering 146 See id. at 145, 147 ("[N]o group right to an equal share of political power was ever intended by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment."). 147 Cf. supra text accompanying note 60 (concluding that under Justices Frankfurter and Harlan's "got theory" argument the mere possibility of a civic rationale would validate seemingly racial motives). 148 This confusing fragmentation on the Court obscures a surprising and deep agreement. Despite their great differences as to whether the courts can decide such claims, eight Justices agree that the Constitution forbids at least extreme forms of partisan gerrymandering and the remaining Justice, Justice Kennedy, believes that it might do so. The four dissenting Justices, of course, necessarily believe this. Otherwise, they could not authorize judicial intervention. And Justice Kennedy must hold out this possibility if he truly believes that future plaintiffs might persuade the Court that judicially manageable standards to address such claims exist. 156 The positions of these five are unsurprising. What is surprising is that the four Justices who held that no judicially manageable standards exist could believe that the Constitution itself proscribes extreme gerrymandering. As they make clear, the justiciability problem is epistemological, not ontological. In other words, they believe a constitutional rule against such gerrymandering manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable . . . ."). 153 See id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I would not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases."). 154 See id. at 1798-99 ("If workable standards do emerge to measure these burdens, however, courts should be prepared to order relief."). 155 See id. at 1812 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating a standard that asks "whether the legislature allowed partisan considerations to dominate and control the lines drawn, forsaking all neutral principles."); id. at 1817 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (calling for a standard that requires "a plaintiff to satisfy elements of a prima facie cause of action" and then allowing the state to rebut the evidence and "offer an affirmative justification for the districting choices"); id. at 1827-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing indicia to identify the "unjustified entrenching in power of a political party that the voters have rejected"). 156 See id. at 1795 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("That no . . . standard has emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the future.").
exists but that the courts cannot describe it. It is like firmly believing there is a God, but that knowing anything about this God lies beyond human understanding.
Justice Scalia makes this clear for the plurality in his criticism of Justice Stevens's recognition of individual district-specific gerrymandering claims. Justice Scalia carefully separates out the argument that political gerrymandering poses no constitutional difficulties, an argument with which he disagrees, from the argument that the courts can do anything about these difficulties. He writes:
Much of [Justice Stevens's] dissent is addressed to the incompatibility of severe partisan gerrymanders with democratic principles. We do not disagree with that judgment, any more than we disagree with the judgment that it would be unconstitutional for the Senate to employ, in impeachment proceedings, procedures that are incompatible with its obligation to "try" impeachments. The issue we have discussed is not whether severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but whether it is for the courts to say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy. . . . . . . Justice Stevens says we err in assuming that politics is an ordinary and lawful motive in districting-but all he brings forward to contest that is the argument that an excessive injection of politics is unlawful. So it is, and so does our opinion assume.
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan's "got theory" argument, 158 the plurality's position provides no fig leaf for improper legislative motivations. It does not pretend to defer to a conflicting but permissible theory of democracy. It just steps out of the way without making any statement about what the legislature did and so creates no dangerous false consciousness about legislative motivations. In fact, insofar as it insists that the Constitution does care about improper partisanship in redistricting but remains silent as to how it cares, the plurality's position may encourage citizens to engage and evaluate gerrymanders more critically. They will, after all, have little by which to judge them other than their own best "theories" of democratic fair play.
C. The Academic Debate
The academic commentary on partisan gerrymandering looks a little different. It reaches more widely than the reasoning of the Supreme Court and at times illustrates the more traditional use of the "got theory" argument as a conversation-stopper. The best example of the debate is the recent spirited interchange between Samuel Issacharoff and Nathaniel Persily in the Harvard Law Review. In his piece, Issacharoff criticizes partisan gerrymandering primarily because it leads to uncompetitive districts, and he ultimately proposes a strong form of prophylaxis: "[T]he Court should forbid ex ante the participation of self-interested insiders in the redistricting process, instead of trying to police redistricting outcomes ex post." 159 In other words, he would find unconstitutional any plan resulting from a process controlled by insiders. In his response, Persily takes on many of Issacharoff's claims. He argues, among other things, that incumbent turnover rates are healthy, 160 that congressional districts are largely competitive, 161 and that because incumbency rates are similar in statewide and districted races that gerrymandering cannot be responsible for any lack of competitiveness. 162 Both he and Issacharoff impressively mount a wide variety of empirical evidence in support of their respective positions. 163 At bottom, however, their disagreement is largely normative. Issacharoff believes that most districting plans reflect officeholders' political self-interest, which impairs political competitiveness, responsiveness, and accountability. Persily, on the other hand, believes that these are only some of many possible legitimate values and that legislatures should remain free to pursue others. As he puts it:
[F]or several reasons politicians should be in charge of politics. . . .
[C]oncerns about representation and governance are of equal weight to concerns about electoral competition, and there is no philosophically uncontestable reason why judges should force one set of values rather than another down the throat of state governments. 164 To Persily, a constitutional rule, let alone one that takes redistricting out of the hands of legislatures, will foreclose "alternative redistricting strategies [that] maximize . . . welfare in different ways." 165 In particular:
groups, such as moderate voters, should be given greater voice. By breathing those principles into the Constitution and striking down every existing districting system, however, judges would be mandating a particularistic and highly contestable vision of the proper working of American democracy. Those hoping to take the politics out of the redistricting process must be very confident that they have discovered a way to strike the balance between the competing political values central to democratic government. Lacking that confidence, I would leave the ultimate decision to the admittedly self-interested but more accountable political bodies that have found various ways of striking the balance. 167 Sound familiar? Persily is channeling Justices Frankfurter and Harlan. Like them, he points to other theories of politics as a reason to foreclose constitutional regulation. Where he differs from his predecessors is that he offers arguments in support of some of these alternatives. Although many will not agree with his reasoning, 168 he does defend his theories. Unlike his predecessors, he does not simply assert or assume their validity.
Another similarity between Persily and his predecessors, however, undermines his effort to employ these alternative theories to normatively justify districting plans. Like Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, Persily does not require that any of these theories actually underlie a districting plan. That one could support a plan will suffice. 169 His reluctance to require a showing that a disputed plan actually embodies a theory is understandable. Doing so would follow Justice Stewart down his blind alley. 170 How would a court tell the difference between a plan embodying a possibly confusing mixture of theories and one embodying no theory at all? How civically embarrassing would it be to uncover the actual justification for a plan, which may often be nothing more than incumbent self-interest? In short, Persily is absolutely right, as were Justices Frankfurter and Harlan before him. Imposing one particular theory on politics comes at a loss, for it displaces other possibly valid theories. But his own approach, like Justices Frankfurter and Harlan's, fails to require-or even make likely-that a districting plan will embody any theory at all. This is not to say that Issacharoff is right. His approach will strike many as exceeding clear constitutional authority. Indeed, any broad ex ante prophylactic approach will be controversial in this way. It is easy, though, to see his motivation. Putting districting into the hands of people who have no direct partisan or incumbency interest in its outcome would presumably reduce the influence of these types of selfinterest, while leaving room for the plan to reflect the types of values Persily mentions 171 -and others. Although Issacharoff is concerned with competitiveness and incumbent entrenchment, he does not actually impose competitiveness on the redistricting process to the exclusion of other values. Rather, Issacharoff tries to remove direct incumbency and partisan concerns from the process as much as possible so that other more legitimate values may flourish. Unless I am misreading him, an independent redistricting commission should be free to follow the kinds of policies Persily advocates if it thought them wise.
That leaves two other options. One is to follow the course the Court itself took in the original reapportionment cases. There the Court imposed a particular theory of representation on the redistricting process to the exclusion of other theories.
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It did not do so, however, because the theory was incontestably better than all others. It was not. It did so rather because the theory was easy to administer and had some democratic virtues 173 and, most importantly, because imposing some theory was the only way to ensure that any theory other than legislative self interest underlay districting schemes.
174 171 See Persily, supra note 160, at 680 (arguing that redistricting should be delegated to those who are able to "strike the balance between the competing political values central to democratic government"). 172 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that state legislative districts must be divided equally by population). 173 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 121 (1998) ("In fact, administrability is [the] long suit [of the one person, one vote principle] . . . ."). 174 See text accompanying notes 70-71 (arguing that the one person, one vote standard was chosen because it was an administrable theory of apportionment that would ensure some theoretical basis).
In the gerrymandering context, there is no simple, obvious candidate for such a theory, but there are several messy contenders. One approach would be to return to so-called traditional redistricting principles like geographical compactness, contiguity, and preserving political subdivisions and communities of interest.
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While clear, agreed-upon yardsticks to measure these factors are unavailable, and trade-offs among them can be made in many legitimate ways, forcing some concern for these issues would reduce the freedom legislators now have to pursue unwholesome ends.
A quite different approach, which was argued by some in Vieth v. Jubelirer, looks to legislative motive.
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Like Issacharoff's approach, it seeks to prevent bad motives from infecting districting plans, but does so through ex post review rather than ex ante prophylactic structuring. This approach would follow the controversial lead of the Court's Shaw v. Reno line of cases. 177 Many have criticized that line of cases, 178 but their aim is to screen plans after enactment for impermissible levels of racial motivation. The Court could take a similar (and perhaps similarly uncomfortable) approach with respect to certain partisan and incumbency motivations. In fact, the dissenters in Vieth argued different combinations of these two approaches. 179 It was their messiness, however, that persuaded the plurality that no judicially manageable standards existed.
